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WHEN DOES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH ACCRUE UNDER
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS
LIABILITY ACT?
By GEORGE W. HULBERT'*
The Act of Congress of the United States, and its amend-
ments, approved April 22, 1908, and commonly called the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, provides that "No action
shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced
within two years from the day the cause of action accrued." 1
The word accrued has caused the courts considerable diffi-
culty. In relation to a personal injury not resulting in death,
there has been no particular trouble; the cause of action
accrues at the time of the injury and if no action is com-
menced within two years therefrom, it cannot be maintained
afterwards:
When, however, there is an injury resulting in death, the
determination of the date of the accrual of the cause of action
is fraught with some difficulty. The crux of the difficulty is
the obvious fact that a cause of action for wrongful death
cannot accrue until the death. When the accident and the
death are simultaneous, no problem arises; but often when
the death occurs some time after the accident, the courts have
been perplexed by the statute.
At one time it was held that the right of action for death
accrues upon the appointment of an administrator. In Ameri-
can R. Co. of Porto Rico v. Coronas,2 the injury occurred on
November 30, 1908, and death resulted on December 8, 1908.
Letters of administration were issued on May 12, 1914, and
suit was filed on December 17, 1914. The court held the
cause of action did not accrue so that the limitation attached
0 Of the Gary Bar.
lUnited States Statutes at Large, Chap. 149, p. 65; also 45 USCA 56.
2 (Porto Rico, 1916), 230 F. 545.
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until the administrator was appointed. The court followed
the theory that the action could not accrue until there was in
existence some one capable of suing.3
However, the holding of these cases has been definitely
abandoned. In Reading Co. v. Koons, Adin., 4 the employee
was injured April 22, 1915, and the resulting death occurred
on April 23, 1915. Letters of administration were granted
to the plaintiff on September 23, 1921, and suit was com-
menced on February 6, 1922. The question never before
directly answered by the Supreme Court of the United States
was: Does the two-year statute of limitations begin to run
from the date of the death or from the date of the appoint-
ment of an administrator? The opinion of the court is writ-
ten by Justice Stone and is in part as follows:
"Every practical consideration which would lead to the imposition of
any period of limitation would require that the period should begin to
run from the definitely ascertained time of death rather than the uncer-
tain time of the appointment of an administrator. Here the appoint-
ment was not made until six years after the death. No reason appears,
if the opinion of the court below is followed, why the time might not
have been extended indefinitely by the failure to apply for administra-
tion. The only persons who can procure the appointment of an adminis-
trator are, ordinarily, spouse, next of kin, or creditors of the decedent.
Certainly the common carrier would have no standing to make the ap-
plication. The very purpose of a period of limitation is that there may
be, at some definitely ascertainable period, an end to litigation. If the
persons who are the designated beneficiaries of the right of action created
may choose their own time for applying for the appointment of an ad-
ministrator and consequently for setting the statute running, the two-
year period of limitation, so far as it applies to actions for wrongful
death, might as well have been omitted from the statute."5
In regard to the meaning of accrued the court in this
opinion states that the word refers to the time when all of
the events have transpired which determine the liability of
s See also Guinther v. Philadelphia & P. R. Co. (CCANJ 1924), 1 F
(2d) 85.
4 (1926), 271 U. S. 58, 70 L. Ed. 835.
5 See also Brooks v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. (1921), 107 S. E. 878;
(1922) 110 S. E. 328.
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the carrier, and that when all of these events have happened,
the cause of action has come into existence or has accrued.
However, Reading Co. v. Koons6 does not clearly cover:
(1) the situation in which the action is commenced within
two years of a death occurring more than two years after the
injury; (2) the situation in which the action is commenced
within two years of a death occurring less than two years after
the injury.
(1) The situation in which the action is commenced
within two years of a death occurring more than two years
after the injury is-conclusively covered by Rogers v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co.7 In this case the employee was injured Novem-
ber 10, 1922, and the resulting death was on February 4,
1925. Action was brought for injuries (actions for injuries
survive under the Act, 45 USCA 59) as well as death by the
administratrix on December 2, 1926. It was held that the
statute of limitations had run; that as there was no cause of
action of any kind in the employee at the time of his death,
there could be none in the administratrix. 8
An action for wrongful death, obviously, can not be com-
menced before the death; and if the death does not occur
within the two years following the injury, an action for wrong-
ful death can not arise. The right of the personal repre-
sentative is predicated upon the existence of a right of action
in the deceased immediately preceding his death. If the de-
ceased himself could not have maintained an action brought
at the time of his death, the personal representative can not.
It is error to conclude that a cause of action for wrongful
death always accrues at the date of the death. If the death
occurs more than two years after the injury, the action for
wrongful death does not accrue at all, for there can not prop-
erly be one, there being no cause of action in the deceased at
the time of his death.
(2) One other situation should be discussed. If the em-
6 (1926), 271 U. S. 58, 70 L. Ed. 835.
7 (N. Y., 1927), 19 F. (2d) 522.
8 See also Flynn, Executor etc., v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 283 U. S.
53-56; 75 L. Ed. 837 (1933, Conn.).
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ployee lives for, say, one year, after the injury, and then dies,
and his personal representative files suit within two years of
the death, but more than two years after the injury, then
what? In Dusek v. Pennsylvani.z R. R. Co.,9 the deceased
was injured on April 20th, 1928. His death resulted Feb-
ruary 12th, 1929. A complaint for wrongful death was filed
April 21st, 1930; the writ of summons was prepared and
signed April 21, 1930, was received by the United States
Marshal on July 8, 1930, and was served on the defendant
July 10, 1930.
Here the death occurred within two years of the date of
the injury and suit was not commenced until more than two
years after the date of the injury. The question to be de-
cided by the court was: When did the cause of action accrue?
If it accrued at the date of the injury, the action would be
barred by the statute. If it accrued at the date of the death,
the action would lie.
The deceased had neither filed suit in his lifetime for his
injuries, nor had he made any settlement whatsoever. The
court court held that
". .. at his death, the right to bring action for the loss thereby
occasioned, was unimpaired by anything which, while he had lived, he
had done or failed to do. . . Concluding as we do that under the
facts here appearing, the cause of action for the wrongful death accrued
on the date of the death, the suit was begun in ample time. .. .
It is thus clear that an injured employee penalizes his bene-
ficiaries by living too long. If he lives for more than two
years after the injury, and then dies as a result of the injury
without having filed any action, his personal representative is
barred by the statute of limitations from properly filing for
either injuries or death. But if the injured employee dies
within two years of the date of the injury, then the personal
representative may file suit for wrongful death within two
years of the date of the death, the date of the death being
the date of the accrual of the cause of action in such a case.
0 (Ind., 1933), 68 F. (2d) 131.
10 See also Bell v. Wabash R. R. Co. (Mo., 1932), 58 F. (2d) 569.
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Under the decision of Dusek v. Pennsylvania R. R., 11 it ap-
pears that it would be possible for a suit for wrongful death
to be properly filed within four years after the injury when
the resulting death occurred within two years after the acci-
dent. Suppose an employee is injured January 1, 1932, and
that his resulting death occurs on December 31, 1934, his
personal representative may file suit for his wrongful death
on December 31, 1936, nearly four years after the accident,
and the Statute of Limitations would not be a bar.
Conclusions: (1) A cause of action for personal injuries
either by the employee during his lifetime or by his personal
representative after his death, commenced more than two
years after the accident, is barred by the statute of limitations.
(2) A cause of action for wrongful death commenced
more than two years after the death is barred.
(3) A cause of action for wrongful death commenced
within two years of a death occurring more than two years
after the injury, is barred by the statute.
(4) A cause of action for wrongful death commenced
within two years of a death occurring within two years of the
injury is not barred.
11 (Ind., 1933), 68 F. (2d) 131.
